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Abstract
What affects the allocation of aid by international organizations to their member states? Using data
on nuclear assistance by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), I demonstrate that political
considerations affect the likelihood of receiving aid, and the amount of aid countries receive. Specifically,
I find that membership in the IAEA Board of Governors or acceptance of tougher IAEA inspections
increase the likelihood of IAEA assistance, and in some cases the amounts of assistance, but only for
countries that do not share policy preferences with the US. This finding is consistent with theories that
foreign aid is given in exchange for cooperation and concessions to recipients that are not likely to be
cooperative without aid. I also examine whether nuclear assistance is given to countries that need it the
most and that can make effective use of this aid, and find only partial support for need-based explanations
of aid allocation.
Introduction
Which countries are more likely to apply for and receive aid from international organizations (IOs), and what
accounts for the amount of aid they receive and the areas in which they receive assistance? Existing studies
highlight the role of various political and need-based factors. In this paper, I evaluate these explanations
in the context of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA or the Agency). I examine the IAEA
Technical Cooperation (TC) program through which the Agency delivers assistance to its member states in
the application for nuclear technologies for peaceful purposes. As part of the TC, the IAEA provides or
pays for training, expert advice, or equipment in member states in order to build, strengthen, and maintain
their capacity to use nuclear technologies in areas such as medicine, agriculture, energy, water, and basic
sciences. Participation rate in TC is very high, with about 80% of member states receiving some form of
assistance every year. Using data on the allocation of IAEA TC assistance between 2000 and 2004, I find
that countries that do not share policy preferences with the US become more likely to receive aid from the
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IAEA, and receive more assistance, when they serve in influential positions in the Agency or make policy
concessions related to nuclear nonproliferation. Furthermore, while TC recipients’ economic performance is
related to distribution of TC aid, it has a differential effect on the likelihood of assistance, its amounts, and
the area of assistance.
The IAEA is a United Nations (UN)-affiliated agency that focuses on promoting safe, secure, and peaceful
applications of nuclear technologies. Currently, over 160 countries are members of the IAEA.1 In addition to
promoting the peaceful uses of nuclear energy through the TC program, which is the focus of this paper, the
IAEA plays a key role in two additional areas: nuclear verification and safety. The IAEA performs nuclear
inspections to verify states’ compliance with their international obligations, such as the commitment under
the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) to use nuclear materials only for peaceful
purposes. The IAEA is also considered to be the international authority on nuclear safety and security, it
drafts recommendations on issues such as nuclear and radiological emergencies, and serves as the depositary
of key international nuclear safety and security conventions.
The TC program is not unique to the IAEA, and many UN specialized agencies and organizations
operate similar programs designed to transfer knowledge and build member states’ capacity.2 Previous
studies conducted mostly in the context of the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank, and
the World Trade Organization (WTO) provide several explanations for how IOs allocate resources to their
members. According to one approach, IOs assist states who need it the most, and can use these resources
effectively in order to advance the declared goals of the assistance (needs-driven explanation) (Bird and
Rowlands, 2001; Willett, 2002). Other views highlight political considerations that affect the allocation of
aid, such as the recipients’ proximity to the US (Benvenisti and Downs, 2005; Stone, 2008; Vreeland, 2005),
their position within the organization (Bueno de Mesquita and Smith, 2010; Dreher, Sturm and Vreeland,
2006) and concessions-for-aid exchange (Urpelainen, 2012). My findings based on data from the IAEA offer
evidence for some of these explanations, and also suggest that they may interact in so far under-explored
ways. First, some aspects of the IAEA TC are need-driven – for example, countries with lower GDP are
more likely to receive agriculture- and health-related assistance. However, other types of aid, in particular
assistance in the nuclear fuel-cycle area, are given to relatively well-off members. Moreover, political factors
– proximity to the US, country’s position within the IO, and policy concessions matter, and their effects are
conditional on each other. Specifically, countries that do not share policy preferences with the US become
1The latest list of members is available here: https://www.iaea.org/about/governance/list-of-member-states.
2The list of all UN-affiliated agencies and organizations is available here: http://www.un.org/depts/los/Links/UN-links.
htm. The websites of these organizations suggest that all of them operate some sort of technical cooperation program.
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more likely to receive TC, and receive larger amounts, when they serve on the IAEA Board of Governors
(BOG), which is the key decision-making body of the Agency, or after they make significant concessions in
the area of nuclear nonproliferation.
There are several advantages to focusing on the IAEA. First, the Agency plays an important role in
several cases of political importance to the US, among them the Iranian nuclear issue. Thus, if resources
are used to elicit cooperation from countries that do not share the US preferences, it should be evident in
the case of the IAEA. Second, there are extensive data on annual allocation of the IAEA TC starting from
2004, including which countries receive assistance, as well as the amounts and the type of assistance that
they receive. Finally, there is also the advantage of focusing on a single IO because comparisons across
organizations are problematic given the underlying differences among them. This also means, however, that
the findings presented here are based on evidence from this particular organization, and that other IOs may
distribute their resources differently.
This analysis has several implications. First, my findings complement recent studies of nuclear coop-
eration (Fuhrmann, 2009a,b; Kroenig, 2009a,b) by illuminating the determinants of nuclear assistance and
expanding the analysis beyond the interstate bilateral context to the IAEA. Similarly to these studies, I find
support for the argument that strategic interests shape the allocation of nuclear assistance. Furthermore,
several recent studies raise the concern that civilian nuclear cooperation, including the assistance provided
by the IAEA, may contribute to nuclear proliferation (Brown and Kaplow, 2014; Fuhrmann, 2009a). This
prospect highlights the importance of understanding which countries receive such assistance in the first place,
and this paper provides such analysis. Importantly, my findings offer some reassurance, at least regarding
the IAEA TC: I show that agreeing to tighter nonproliferation inspections by potential TC recipients mod-
erates the effect of other political factors (shared interests with the US) on the likelihood and the amount
of assistance.
I proceed as follows. First, I present the background on the IAEA and its TC program. Then, I review
previous studies and outline hypotheses about the determinants of TC allocation. Next, I briefly discuss the
data and the empirical strategy, and present the results of the analysis. I conclude by summarizing the main
argument and findings, and pointing out several implications of this analysis.
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The IAEA and Technical Cooperation
Background on the IAEA
The IAEA is a UN-affiliated international organization established in 1957 as part of the Atoms for Peace
Initiative. The Agency is governed by two bodies: the General Conference (GC) of all member states, and
the Board of Governors (BOG, or the Board) that is considered to be the most important decision-making
body of the Agency.3 The Agency has a staff of over 2,500 employees and it is headed by an elected Director
General.4
The BOG is composed of thirty five members, twelve of which are designated, and the remaining twenty
three are elected to serve for a period of two years (Scheinman, 1987, 82-83). The twelve designated countries
are considered to be the most advanced in the nuclear field, globally or regionally (IAEA, 1956, Article
IV.A.1): Canada, China, France, Russia, UK, US, Argentina or Brazil, South Africa, Japan, India, Australia,
and one European (usually Scandinavian) country – Denmark, Finland, Norway or Sweden (Fischer, 1997,
39-40). Most of them always serve on the Board. The other twenty three members are elected by the GC
based on quotas allocated for regional groups, and they serve for two years.
In recent years, the IAEA and the BOG have become key players in the international debates surrounding
the Iranian nuclear program. Between 2003 and 2012, the Board has adopted twelve resolutions on the
matter, and has referred it to the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) that has subsequently imposed
sanctions against Iran. Despite the initial unanimity, since September 2005 BOG resolutions on Iran were
adopted by a majority vote due to the growing disagreements among the Board members on this issue.
The Agency’s Statute authorizes it to promote and facilitate peaceful uses of nuclear energy by supplying
materials, services, equipment, and facilities to its member states, "with due consideration for the needs
of the under-developed areas of the world" (IAEA, 1956, Article III.A.2). TC program is the main vehicle
through which the IAEA distributes aid to its members. The IAEA also plays a key role of inspecting
nuclear activities within member states, to make sure they comply with their nonproliferation commitments
and do not develop nuclear weapons. In particular, the IAEA monitors compliance with the Treaty on the
Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). The TC and the nuclear verification are the central pillars of
the IAEA, and this is also reflected in the distribution of resources between these two programs. In addition,
3The BOG "makes recommendations to the General Conference on the IAEA’s accounts, program, and budget and considers
applications for membership. It also approves safeguards agreements and the publication of the IAEA’s safety standards
and has the responsibility for appointing the Director General of the IAEA with the approval of the General Conference",
http://www.iaea.org/About/Policy/Board/.
4IAEA website, http://www.iaea.org/About/staff.html
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the IAEA also serves as the international authority on the safe use of nuclear and radioactive materials,
drafts recommendations for safety standards and procedures of response to emergencies, and also serves as
the depositary of key international conventions in nuclear safety and security.
IAEA member states hold different views about the right balance between the IAEA’s regulatory and
monitoring role, and its mandate to promote the use of nuclear energy (Findlay, 2012, 86-87), (Fischer,
1997, 325-328; 335), (Scheinman, 1987, 246). The developing countries attach high importance to TC, and
view it as a form of developmental assistance. Conversely, the developed countries view TC assistance as a
benefit given to the developing countries in exchange for allowing the IAEA to focus on the implementation
of nuclear safeguards and nuclear safety and security. One of the key recent initiatives designed to strengthen
the IAEA verification capacity is the Additional Protocol (AP) that supplements states’ IAEA safeguard
agreements (IAEA, 1997). Unlike the existing agreements that focus on verification of declared materials,
the AP enables the IAEA to provide assurances about both declared and undeclared materials by expanding
the Agency’s inspectors’ access rights to information and sites (Findlay, 2012, 62-63). The US has been one
of the strongest supporters of the AP, as part of the US emphasis on strengthening the IAEA safeguards
to prevent nuclear proliferation. Member states can choose whether to join the AP, but once they do, it
becomes legally binding. As of June 2016, one hundred twenty six member states have joined the AP, and
twenty others have signed but have yet to ratify it.
Although joining the AP is not a condition for receiving TC assistance, the IAEA and the developed
countries seeking to strengthen nuclear safeguards view TC as a means to encourage participation in the AP,
especially among developing countries that are in need of TC assistance. Such countries are more likely to
accept additional nonproliferation obligations if they believe the IAEA would also address their developmental
needs (Hibbs, 2013). A concrete recent example of the connection between TC and nonproliferation is
the IAEA’s denial in 2006 of Iran’s request for safety-related assistance to its nuclear research reactor
due to nonproliferation concerns (Landler, 2006). In 2015, Iran has reached an agreement with the five
permanent UNSC members, Germany and the EU. As part of this deal, Iran has agreed to implement
the AP (The White House, 2015). Following this declaration, Iran has requested the IAEA to renew TC
assistance to Iran (Tehran Times Political Desk, 2016). The Iranian case suggests that there may be a linkage
between recipients’ nonproliferation commitments and the allocation of TC resources, whereby accepting
nonproliferation commitments is viewed by the Agency and by the influential members (for example, the US
as well as other developed countries) as a positive sign that would allow states to request TC on the basis
of their nonproliferation behavior.
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Overview of the IAEA TC program
The IAEA TC program is sustained through member states’ voluntary contributions to the TC Fund (TCF).
The expected contribution is based on the UN assessment rate.5 The developed countries are the primary
donors to the TCF, with the US being the largest donor (25% of TCF budget in 2004-2012), followed by
Japan (16%), Germany (8%), UK (6%), Italy (5%), Canada (3%), Spain (3%), China (2%), and South Korea
(2%).
Some projects are also funded using extra-budgetary sources such as government cost-sharing, donations,
and the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) funds, though most of national projects rely on the
TCF (see Table 1).
Table 1: TC amounts, 2004-2012
Year Total amount disbursed TC funds disbursed # countries that receive TC
2004 48,972,584 42,576,852 104
2005 50,464,676 43,783,588 108
2006 63,445,580 52,854,632 112
2007 60,630,092 50,875,052 114
2008 64,442,728 54,405,960 115
2009 51,833,700 43,111,400 117
2010 68,315,944 52,964,952 119
2011 45,716,976 33,914,752 114
2012 45,421,344 36,126,604 119
The amounts are in $US adjusted for inflation, 2009 is the base year.
Only national disbursements are included; regional projects are excluded.
Source: IAEA TC Annual Reports (multiple years)
Figure 1 depicts TC amounts allocation to country-years for the 2004-2012 period. The mean annual
allocation is $403,457 per country-year, and the median allocation is $346,741 (both figures in 2009 $US).
As shown in Figure 1, almost 30% of all country-years receive nothing or very small amounts. About 20%
of the IAEA members do not receive any TC during the years studied here. Most of the disbursements are
below 1 million $US per country-year, with some outliers in the 1-2 million range (for example, 1.9 million
$US to Poland in 2005).
TC projects provide support in various areas, such as agriculture, human health and pharmaceuticals,
food supply, monitoring and managing of water resources, industrial applications, energy and nuclear power,
radiation protection, nuclear safety and security, as well as basic sciences. For example, the IAEA provides
assistance in applying nuclear technologies for pest control in agriculture, training of health workers to
5http://www.un.org/en/ga/contributions/budget.shtml
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Figure 1: TC amounts to country-years during 2004-2012 period
apply radioactive materials for diagnostics and treatment, and the use of radioactive isotopes to manage
groundwater and aquifers.6 IAEA TC assists by transferring equipment, providing expert services, training,
fellowships, and scientific visits. With respect to the latter, the IAEA pays for and arranges visits by senior
scientists in IAEA laboratories, or in national facilities of one of the members states. TC is provided to
various entities, such as national nuclear authorities, other government bodies, hospitals, nuclear power
plants operators, as well as individual scientists.
Application to and approval of IAEA assistance
All IAEA members are entitled to apply for TC. Countries interested in assistance submit proposals through
their official representatives in the IAEA headquarters. Figure 2 depicts the process of TC approval. Pro-
posals include a work plan and a timetable; identify the amount of money or the specific assistance that the
IAEA is requested to provide; explain how the particular projects fits into a national program, and whether
the government supports promoting the goal behind the project; and justify why nuclear technology is the
best way to pursue the project’s goals, and whether the requesting country has the necessary safety and
6Additional information and examples of TC projects are available on the IAEA TC website, https://www.iaea.org/
technicalcooperation/areas-of-work/index.html.
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Figure 2: A typical timeline of IAEA TC funding approval
security arrangements in place to implement the project (IAEA, 2011). The IAEA TC staff reviews the
proposals, and returns them with comments to the submitting countries. After several rounds of comments,
revisions and resubmissions, the IAEA TC makes recommendation to the Board, which is the final authority
that approves funding.7
The IAEA applies several criteria to assess applications. First, nonproliferation concerns may affect TC
assistance, even though currently there is no formal linkage between the applicant’s nonproliferation record
and the right to receive TC.8 Second, in projects that involve the use of nuclear materials, the IAEA assesses
whether the applicant’s nuclear safety infrastructure is adequate for the proposed activity.9
Third, the IAEA is more likely to support proposals that are in line with the national development
goals as defined by the applicant’s government, and that enjoy a strong government backing. In addition,
proposals that demonstrate that nuclear technologies are necessary to achieve these national goals, and that
there are high chances of success are more likely to be approved (IAEA, 2002). These criteria suggest that
better governing capacity should be associated with a higher likelihood of IAEA TC allocation.
Fourth, countries that concluded the Revised Supplementary Agreement (RSA) Concerning the Provision
of Technical Assistance by the IAEA are more likely to participate in TC projects, although some receive
assistance without such an agreement (EU, 2012, see point 5).10
7For the most current timeline of TC approval see Longoria (2013, slide 9) and IAEA (2011, 8).
8Email exchange with a nuclear nonproliferation expert, March 2016.
9Email correspondence with the IAEA Press and Public Information officer, March 2016.
10By concluding the RSA, a member state agrees that TC projects are subject, if needed, to the safeguards provisions. The
RSA also contains provisions on safety standards, peaceful use undertaking, physical protection, and the transfer of title to
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Finally, the IAEA provides preferential allocation of TC assistance to member states with a good record of
financial support for the TC fund (IAEA, 2007). Even though contributions to TCF are voluntary, countries
that do not pay their expected share are likely to receive lower amounts of assistance from the fund. This
factor affects primarily the levels of TC assistance (Aning, 2014).
Even though all the IAEA members are eligible to apply for TC, in practice not all countries receive
assistance. For example, between 2004 and 2012, about 20% of member states did not receive any TC. Some
countries may not apply every year, while others may not apply at all. In some cases, the Agency may also
refuse to provide assistance, as it happened in the case of Iran in 2006 (Landler, 2006). The publicly-available
data on the IAEA TC allocation provides information only on those countries that receive assistance, but
not those that are declined, or those that do not apply for TC. The set of non-recipients includes countries
that do not request TC as well as countries whose applications for assistance the Agency denied. Although
there is no data that allows us to distinguish between these cases, it is known that most of the developed
high-income countries do not apply for TC, and participate only as TCF donors (Fischer, 1997, 348-349).
Indeed, Table A1 in the supporting material shows that most of the Agency’s members that do not receive
any TC in this period are developed countries. Nevertheless, dropping all the developed countries from
the analysis is not a solution because some developed countries receive TC in non-negligible amounts. For
example, South Korea, Greece, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Portugal, Poland, as well as all countries in
Latin America are among TC recipients during the years that this paper focuses on (2004-2012). In this
group, Poland and Brazil are among the top ten recipients of TC. This suggests that TC recipients vary in
the extent of their economic development, their geographic location, and political preferences. Nonetheless,
the unavailability of data on TC requests and denials could limit the inferences we can draw from data on
projects that are funded. This could be especially problematic if TC requests are correlated with some of
the determinants of TC allocation. I discuss these potential limitations in the Summary and Implications
section, and highlight which findings in my analysis may be affected by this selection problem.
What Explains the Allocation of IAEA TC Assistance?
Existing studies offer several explanations for how IOs allocate resources to member states. One view
suggests that recipients’ needs, and their capacity to utilize assistance shape aid allocation. An alternative
explanation maintains that donors’ interests, and in particular the interests of the US, dominate recipients’
equipment and materials. The model text is available in IAEA (N.d.).
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needs. Another approach argues that countries that occupy positions in key IO bodies receive more assistance
than countries that do not serve in central positions. Finally, some scholars argue that assistance is given
in exchange for policy concessions that recipients provide to donors or to IOs. In the rest of this section, I
examine these explanations, and formulate hypotheses about the determinants of aid allocation.
Recipients’ needs and their ability to put TC resources to good use
According to this view, aid allocation is need-driven, and aid is given to recipients who can use it effectively
to address policy problems that led them to ask for assistance in the first place. According to this view,
IO bureaucrats apply policy-oriented judgement to evaluate recipients’ need and ability to use aid, and this
judgements guides aid allocation.
In the spirit of this approach, some scholars suggest that IMF bureaucrats design loans based on macroeco-
nomic factors, borrowers’ needs, and the long-term debt sustainability (Bird and Rowlands, 2001). Similarly,
Willett (2002) maintains that the IMF staff is motivated by genuine policy goals, such as improving the eco-
nomic situation of the borrowing countries. The evidence in favor of the bureaucratic explanation is limited.
In the context of the IMF lending policies, Copelovitch (2010) finds that bureaucrats influence only in cases
that are less important to the interests of the major stakeholders of the Fund. He also finds mixed evidence
with respect to the effect of the recipients’ economic conditions on loans: GDP and per capita GDP are not
associated with the likelihood of receiving a loan, whereas GDP has a positive and per capita GDP has a
negative association with the amount of loan.
The declared purpose of the IAEA TC fits well with the need-driven explanation. The Agency’s guidelines
state that the "IAEA TC projects are designed to fill a well-identified national gap in expertise, capabilities
or infrastructure, to address national development issues and to contribute to the achievement of socioeco-
nomic goals. IAEA TC assistance is needs-driven and is provided on the principle that the recipient Member
State requires expertise (scientific, legal or managerial) or complementary physical facilities that necessitate
the assistance of the IAEA to ensure the optimal utilization of nuclear techniques" (IAEA, 2011, 2). More-
over, professionalism is one of the declared values of the IAEA, and the Agency urges its staff members to
resist political pressures, and to be motivated by professional objectives, rather than personal concerns.11
Historically, the IAEA leadership has also emphasized the professional, rather than political nature of the
Agency (Scheinman, 1987, 209-225).
I test the need-based approach in several ways. First, if TC allocation is need-driven, then less developed
11The values of the IAEA are listed here: https://www.iaea.org/about/employment/values.
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countries should be more likely to benefit from assistance, and should receive larger amounts of TC. However,
since TC assistance is not intended to establish nuclear infrastructure from scratch, but instead to "fill a
well-identified national gap in expertise, capabilities, or infrastructure" (IAEA, 2011, 2), we should not
expect it to be provided to the least developed recipients, but to recipients with medium level of resources.
Hypothesis 1a Countries with moderate level of national resources are more likely to receive TC assis-
tance, and conditional on assistance, receive larger amounts, than the least developed and the most developed
countries.
With respect to areas of assistance, this logic implies that countries with moderate levels of resources
are more likely to receive nuclear fuel-cycle assistance. The IAEA is less likely to provide such assistance
to the least developed countries, since they have other, more urgent needs, and they might not possess the
infrastructure to sustain fuel-cycle activities. Such assistance is also less likely to benefit highly developed
countries since they have domestic capabilities to address their needs in these areas without the IAEA
assistance. Thus, countries that are moderately developed are more likely to benefit from fuel-cycle-related
TC assistance. Conversely, assistance with the application of nuclear technologies in agriculture and health
is more likely to be channeled to less developed countries since it addresses more basic needs that these
countries are more likely to have.
Hypothesis 1b Countries with moderate level of resources are more likely to benefit from nuclear fuel-cycle
assistance than the least-developed and the most-developed countries. The least-developed countries are more
likely to receive assistance in health and agriculture.
Another way to test the argument that TC allocation is need-driven is by looking at whether domestic
turmoil affect the likelihood and the amounts of TC. There is anecdotal evidence that intrastate conflict may
adversely affect the level of TC aid, as it happened in the case of Egypt, where TC fell after the uprising. If
this logic is correct, then
Hypothesis 2a Countries that experience intrastate conflict are less likely to receive TC , and conditional
on TC, receive lower amounts than similar countries that do not experience conflict.
Moreover, conflict should affect assistance in the most sensitive areas, and may not affect aid in agriculture
and health, and might even make it more likely:
Hypothesis 2b Intrastate conflict is associated with lower likelihood of TC in the most sensitive areas
(nuclear fuel-cycle), but is not linked to the provision of TC in agriculture and health.
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Relationship with the US
An alternative view suggests that geopolitical factors, rather than policy-related considerations, affect allo-
cation of assistance. This argument is consistent with the findings in Fuhrmann (2009b); Kroenig (2009a)
that alliance and hostility among countries affect bilateral nuclear cooperation. In the IO context, several
studies show how powerful actors use IOs to reward themselves or their friends. Benvenisti and Downs
(2005) demonstrate how the most powerful players in WTO use coercion and brinkmanship to redistribute
upwards the benefits of pharmaceutical drug regime. Other studies report that countries that vote together
with the US in the UN General Assembly, and countries that receive economic and military aid from the
US, enjoy better lending conditions in the IMF (Stone, 2008; Vreeland, 2005). Additional studies find a
connection between the amount of debt a country has to private creditors in the US, and the size of IMF
loan, suggesting that the US interests play an important role in determining the allocation of IMF lending
(Broz and Hawes, 2004). Thus, alignment with the US might be correlated with a more favorable treatment
by the organization.
This explanation has not been examined in the IAEA context, but it seems particularly relevant here.
The US attaches high importance to nuclear issues, and in light of its prominence in IAEA as the single
largest donor to the TC program, the US should be able to exert influence over who gets assistance in
acquiring nuclear-related knowledge and capabilities. Anecdotal evidence does not fully support this theory:
GAO (2009, 11-12) report suggests that countries that cannot receive US bilateral aid in the nuclear area
due to their links with terrorism or because they are not NPT members often enjoy TC assistance from the
US. Nonetheless, the geopolitical logic implies that
Hypothesis 3 Countries that are aligned with the US are more likely to receive TC assistance. Conditional
on receiving TC, they receive larger amounts of assistance than countries that are not aligned with the US.
It is less clear how the relationship with the US should affect the areas of assistance. We might expect
countries that share more preferences with the US to have a better chance to receive more sensitive aid
(nuclear fuel cycle-related) than countries with opposing preferences. However, this depends on whether
these countries are interested to receive such aid. For instance, some of US close friends are already very
developed in the nuclear area, and thus may have no interest in the IAEA assistance. Additionally, the US
allies may benefit from bilateral assistance in sensitive areas, whereas countries that cannot receive such
assistance directly from the US or other nuclear states may be more interested in receiving the IAEA help.
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Membership in IO’s decision-making body
Another explanation suggests that states in a position to affect IO’s decision-making receive material benefits
in exchange for their support for policies that are allied with the US agenda. For example, Bueno de Mesquita
and Smith (2010) find that non-permanent members of the UNSC receive more foreign aid from the US during
their tenure in the Council, and that the aid drops to pre-Council levels once these states end their term.
Similarly, Dreher, Sturm and Vreeland (2006) show that UNSC non-permanent members are more likely to
receive IMF loans with fewer conditions attached to them.
These findings imply that aid serves as a foreign policy tool, rather than an instrument to address
recipients’ needs. Aid is not necessarily given to those who need it and to those who can put it to good
use, but primarily to politically-important countries. The same logic can also be extended to the IAEA TC,
where Board members can affect the Agency’s decision-making. As a result, key players such as the US have
an incentive to offer material benefits (for example, TC assistance) to BOG members. An additional reason
why Board members may benefit more than others from TC assistance is because assistance is ultimately
approved by the BOG.
Hypothesis 4 BOG members are more likely to receive TC assistance. Conditional on receiving TC, they
receive larger amounts of assistance than non-BOG members.
However, since some of the Board members are very advanced nuclear countries, they may not seek the
IAEA aid in the first place, thus offsetting the positive effect that BOG membership has on receiving TC.
This explanation can also be combined with geopolitical reasoning. While overall the US may prefer to
allocate TC resources to friendly countries, it may also want to use TC assistance to appease less friendly
IAEA members, especially when they serve on the Board and can affect the Agency’s work. Thus, the
expectation is that
Hypothesis 5 Countries that do not share preferences with the US become more likely to receive aid, and
receive more aid when they serve on the Board. Board membership should not affect allocation of TC to
countries that are friendly to the US.
As before, it is not clear how BOG membership affects the areas of the IAEA TC. On the one hand, BOG
members may be in a better position to receive sensitive (fuel cycle-related) aid because they approve these
requests. On the other hand, at least some of the Board members are the most advanced nuclear countries,
and thus they may not seek such aid in the first place. With respect to heath and agriculture-related aid, it
is not clear why BOG members should be more likely to receive it.
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Concessions-for-aid
This explanation suggests that states may trade material benefits for policy concessions (Bueno de Mesquita
and Smith, 2007, 2010; Urpelainen, 2012). Most evidence in favor of this argument comes from studies of
bilateral foreign aid. In that context, aid is given to extract policy concessions that recipients are less willing
to provide otherwise. This view implies that, countries are more likely to get aid, and receive larger amounts
of aid when they are less likely to adopt certain policies on their own, and when more aid is required to
convince them to adopt such policies. In the nuclear context, this is related to the argument that incentives
can lead players to make nonproliferation concession. For example, Bernauer and Ruloff (1999) explore
how positive incentives can change countries’ behavior on nonproliferation. cost of compliance argument.
Similarly, Levite (2003) also demonstrates that the promise of bilateral nuclear civilian cooperation has played
an important role in dissuading some countries from acquiring nuclear weapons. Verdier (2008) makes the
argument about the differential costs of compliance, whereby countries with low cost of compliance with
NPT (those that are not interested in acquiring nuclear weapons regardless of the treaty) enjoy only the
benefits of the multilateral arrangement, whereas those with higher costs receive also bilateral incentives to
encourage them to comply.
In the IAEA TC context, this logic suggests that countries that adopt policies viewed as desirable by the
IAEA or by key players within the Agency, such as the US, are rewarded with TC assistance, and that TC
assistance is more likely to benefit those recipients whose interests lie farther away from the US interests.
One such policy is the AP that the US, the IAEA, and many other influential countries see as a necessary
tool to strengthen the Agency’s nonproliferation safeguards.
Hypothesis 6 Countries that share fewer preferences with the US are more likely to receive TC funds, and
are more likely to receive larger amounts of TC funds when they join the AP.
Data
To test these hypotheses, I compile a dataset of all countries that are IAEA members between 2004 and
2012. There are 157 countries in the dataset, 137 of them appear every year, and the remaining 20 join
the Agency during this period, and appear only during the years in which they are members. The unit of
analysis is country-year (N=1,313).
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Dependent variables: participation in IAEA TC
The first dependent variable is TC RECIPIENT i,t, coded one if country i requests and receives TC in year
t, and zero if it does not receive TC (either because it does not request, or because it requests and is being
denied). I use the annual IAEA TC Reports to extract data on recipients (IAEA, 2004-2012).
The second dependent variable is TC AMOUNT i,t, and it measures the logged amount disbursed to
country i in year t from TCF.12 This variable is measured only for those states that receive TC in a given
year (TC RECIPIENT =1).
Finally, to analyze what affects the substantive area of assistance, I use the list of projects supported by
the Agency in every recipient country.13 This list provides the title and the field of activity of every project,
but not the amounts disbursed or the mode of assistance. Still, it allows to learn about the substantive area in
which countries receive assistance from the Agency in a given year. Based on this list, I code two dichotomous
variables. FUEL CYCLE i,t is coded one if country i receives fuel-cycle-related TC assistance in year t, and
is coded zero if it does not receive such assistance, conditional on receiving TC. A project is considered to
be fuel-cycle-related if it falls within field of activity coded as 3 in the IAEA Table (Fuel Cycle and Waste
Management, not including waste management projects), or 4 (Nuclear Engineering and Technology). This
is also the set of projects considered in Brown and Kaplow (2014). Additionally, for each recipient i in year
t, I code whether they receive assistance in agriculture or health. The variable HUMANITARIAN i,t is equal
to one if such assistance was provided, and is equal to zero if not. Agriculture-related projects are those for
which the field of activity is coded 5, and health-related projects are those that belong to the field of activity
coded 6.
Independent variables
To test the need-based explanation, I approximate country’s resources using GDPi,t−1 that is the logarithm
of one-year lagged GDP, controlling for population size, POPULATIONi,t−1.14 I also include the quadratic
term of GDPi,t−1 to account for a possible nonlinear relationship between economic development and TC
assistance. If countries with moderate level of resources benefit more than the least developed or the most
12I exclude disbursements from extra-budgetary sources or from donations since their allocation can follow a different logic
from the one that guides TCF allocation. Table 1 shows that extra-budgetary sources and donations account for a small share
of TC. I also do not include amounts that countries receive through regional projects.
13http://www-tc.iaea.org/tcweb/tcprogramme/selectdatagroup/default.asp
14Following the method in Bueno de Mesquita and Smith (2007, 272), I use PennWorld Tables 7.1 (Heston, Summers and Aten,
2012). The variable GDPi,t−1 is calculated using the following formula: ln(POPULATIONi,t−1×RGDPCHi,t−1×KGi,t−1),
where POPULATION is population size, RGDPCH is the real per capita GDP in constant 2005 $US, and KG is the
government share of real GDP in country i in year t− 1.
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developed, then the coefficient of the quadratic term should be negative.
To estimate the relationship between intrastate conflict and TC, I use CONFLICTSi,t−1 that measures
the number of active violent intrastate conflicts in country i in year t−1. I obtain the data on conflicts from
country-year version of the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset v.4-2012 (Gleditsch et al., 2002; Themnèr
and Wallensteen, 2014). A country is considered as having a conflict if it experiences 25 or more casualties
due to an intrastate armed confrontation in a given year.15
To assess the association between TC allocation and geopolitical variables, I use the measure of distance
between the ideal policy points of the US and each of IAEA members, called US DISTANCE i,t−1. Ideal
point data are obtained from Bailey, Strezhnev and Voeten (Forthcoming), and they are measured using
similarity of voting in the UN General Assembly.16 If countries aligned with US benefit more from TC aid,
then the coefficient of US DISTANCE i,t−1 should be negative.
Data on BOG membership are available on the IAEA website. For each country-year, I code BOGi,t−1
one if country i serves on the Board in year t−1, and zero otherwise. In some specifications, I also distinguish
between elected and designated Board members: ELECTEDi,t−1 and DESIGNATEDi,t−1 are coded one
if country i is elected or designated, respectively, in year t−1 to serve on the Board. I expect the coefficients
of these variables to be positive if serving on the Board increases BOG member’s likelihood of enjoying
TC assistance. To test Hypothesis 5, I interact between BOG i,t−1 and US DISTANCE i,t−1, and between
different types of BOG members and distance to US.
Membership in AP measures concessions that countries make. AP i,t−1 is equal to one if country i’s AP
is in force in year t− 1, and is equal to zero if country i does not have the AP in force in year t− 1. Data
on AP membership is available on the IAEA website.17 To test Hypothesis 6, I include an interaction term
between AP i,t−1 and US DISTANCE i,t−1.
Control variables
Other factors can also affect the allocation of TC assistance. I control for population size, since more
populous countries may receive larger amounts of aid. POPULATIONi,t−1 measures the logged number of
residents in country i in year t− 1.
15An alternative measure of conflict could be terrorist attacks within a country. However, using low-intensity intrastate
conflict is a better measure because terrorist attacks do not necessarily undermine the government’s ability to control its
territory, control nuclear materials, or pursue developmental goals beyond pure survival.
16Specifically, for each country i I calculate the absolute value of the difference between that country’s ideal point and the
ideal point of the US in year t− 1, and rescale this variable to be between zero and one, such that zero indicates full alignment
with the US, and one indicates the farthest ideal point from the US ideal point.
17See http://www.iaea.org/safeguards/documents/AP_status_list.pdf.
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I also control for whether a country is new to the IAEA, since new members may be less familiar with
the Agency, and less likely to apply for TC. NEW MEMBERi,t−1 is equal to one if country i is an IAEA
member for less than five years in year t− 1, and is equal to zero otherwise.
Brown and Kaplow (2014) show that countries with nuclear weapons programs are more active consumers
of TC resources. I, therefore, control for the presence of a nuclear weapons program in a country by including
the NWPROGRAMi,t−1 indicator. Since this paper covers a relatively recent period, I use the online reports
of the Institute for Science and International Society (ISIS).18 During the period covered here, the US, UK,
France, Russia, China, Israel, India, and Pakistan are coded as having an on-going nuclear weapons program.
North Korea is not included in my analysis because it is not an IAEA member. I also code Iran as having
a nuclear weapons program during the entire period, and Syria starting in 2007 because ISIS codes them as
suspicious cases.
I use membership in the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) in year t−1 (NSGi,t) to account for the possible
effect of nuclear capabilities on TC participation and amounts of aid. NSG is a voluntary group of countries
that export items that could be used in the development of nuclear weapons. Participation in this group can
potentially increase the likelihood of receiving TC assistance, or the likelihood of receiving larger amounts of
assistance because it enhances confidence that this assistance will not be misused or transferred to countries
that should not receive it. Data on NSG participation is available from the annual public statements on the
group’s website.19
I also control for political regime type by including a variable DEMOCRACYi,t−1 that ranges from zero
to one, with higher values representing more democratic regimes.20 I control for regime because previous
studies find a connection between recipient’s regime, bilateral foreign aid (Bueno de Mesquita and Smith,
2007), and nuclear cooperation (Fuhrmann, 2009b).
I also control for whether a country signed an RSA with the Agency, and whether it is in good standing in
terms of its financial obligations to the TCF because this variable can affect the amount of TC (Aning, 2014).
I include a binary indicator RSAi,t−1 that is equal to one if a country signed an agreement on provision of
aid, and equal to zero otherwise.21 Also, I include RATE OF ATTAINMENTi,t−1 that measures the share
18These data are available here: http://isis-online.org/nuclear-weapons-programs. Previous quantitative studies of
nuclear proliferation coded the presence of a nuclear program at most until 2002 (Fuhrmann, 2009b; Jo and Gartzke, 2007;
Kroenig, 2009b). Since the IAEA data are available from 2004 and onwards, I use ISIS data to code the presence of a nuclear
weapons program for these years.
19http://www.nuclearsuppliersgroup.org/en/nsg-documents.
20To create this variable I use the following formula: DEMOCRACYi,t−1 =
Democracy Scorei,t−1 - Autocracy Scorei,t−1 +10
20
(Marshall, Jaggers and Gurr, 2013).
21The list of countries with RSA was obtained here: http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Conventions/rsa_
status.pdf.
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Table 2: Summary statistics
Variable Obs Mean Standard deviation Min. Max
TC RECIPIENT 1313 0.78 0.42 0 1
TC AMOUNT (log) 1313 9.73 5.31 0 14.46
FUEL CYCLE 1313 0.13 0.34 0 1
HUMANITARIAN 1313 0.28 0.45 0 1
GDP (log) 1126 27.16 1.74 22.16 32.66
POPULATION (log) 1126 16.25 1.64 9.93 21.00
DEMOCRACY 1243 0.71 0.31 0 1
CONFLICTS 1103 0.22 0.64 0 6
US DISTANCE 1310 0.62 0.20 0 1
BOG 1313 0.24 0.43 0 1
ELECTED 1313 0.22 0.42 0 1
DESIGNATED 1313 0.09 0.29 0 1
AP MEMBER 1313 0.50 0.50 0 1
NEW MEMBER 1313 0.07 0.26 0 1
POWER REACTOR 1313 0.20 0.40 0 1
NSG 1313 0.30 0.46 0 1
NCA 1313 0.11 0.31 0 1
NWPROGRAM 1313 0.07 0.25 0 1
RSA COUNTRY 1313 0.75 0.44 0 1
RATE OF ATTAINMENT 1124 0.63 0.50 0 5.88
that country i paid to the IAEA TC out of the total amount it is expected to pay.
Table 2 reports summary statistics of all the variables.
Findings
The Likelihood of Receiving TC
I use a logit model, adjust for duration dependence by controlling for the number of years since the previous
TC and including cubic splines (Beck, Katz and Tucker, 1998), and employ robust standard errors clustered
by country to correct for spatial dependence.
Table 3 reports the results of four logit models. I start with a simple model without controls, then
add controls, and afterwards add interactions between BOG and US DISTANCE, and between AP and US
DISTANCE. GDPi,t−1 has a negative and statistically not significant association with TC participation in
models without the quadratic term. Once the quadratic term GDP 2i,t−1 is added, the coefficient of GDPi,t−1
becomes positive and significant. The coefficient of the quadratic term is negative and also significant.
This result implies that likelihood of receiving assistance is highest for intermediate values of GDP, but the
probability of participating in TC is lower at both ends of the GDP range. This finding supports Hypothesis
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Table 3: Participation in TC
Coef./Std. err. Coef./Std. err. Coef./Std. err. Coef./Std. err.
GDP (log) -0.11 11.29*** 13.11*** 11.66***
(0.16) (3.66) (4.21) (3.90)
GDP (log) square -0.22*** -0.26*** -0.23***
(0.07) (0.08) (0.08)
Conflicts -0.32 -0.76** -1.03** -0.68*
(0.33) (0.36) (0.42) (0.40)
US Distance 5.77*** 3.82* -3.12 2.29
(1.25) (2.19) (4.72) (2.30)
BOG member -0.63** -0.22 -6.58** -0.29
(0.25) (0.53) (3.31) (0.54)
BOG member × US Distance 14.55*
(8.28)
AP member -0.76** 0.18 0.10 -3.06**
(0.33) (0.37) (0.37) (1.44)
AP member × US Distance 6.15**
(2.87)
Population (log) 0.62 0.55 0.54
(0.38) (0.37) (0.40)
Democracy -1.13 -1.79 -1.26
(1.06) (1.15) (1.12)
New member -2.80*** -2.58*** -2.69***
(0.94) (0.95) (1.01)
NSG member -1.42* -2.99* -1.33
(0.86) (1.81) (0.92)
NW Program 3.58*** 3.48*** 3.34***
(1.18) (1.15) (1.27)
RSA agreement in force 3.31*** 3.34*** 3.41***
(0.59) (0.65) (0.64)
Constant 1.86 -152.55*** -170.40*** -156.12***
(4.60) (50.19) (56.06) (53.30)
Adjustment for No Yes Yes Yes
duration dependence
Pseudo R2 0.25 0.79 0.80 0.79
No. of obs 1088 1066 1066 1066
Note: Logit coefficients and robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses. The dependent
variable is TC RECIPIENT i,t, equal one if country i received TC in year t, and equal zero otherwise. The
first column presents results without controls, and without adjustment for time dependence. The second
column adds controls and adjustment for duration dependence. The third column adds the interaction
between BOG i,t and US DISTANCE i,t. The fourth column presents the interaction between AP i,t and US
DISTANCE i,t
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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1a, according to which countries with moderate levels of resources are more likely to receive TC assistance.22
Intrastate conflict has a negative relationship with TC participation, but it becomes statistically signifi-
cant only once control variables are added. This finding is consistent with the idea that TC funds are given
to recipients that can demonstrate that they can put them to good use (Hypothesis 2a).
With respect to shared interests with the US, the coefficient of US DISTANCE i,t−1 is positive and
significant in models without interactions. However, it loses significance and in one case changes its sign
when interactions and control variables are added. This suggests that alignment of policy preferences with
the US does not have a direct impact on the likelihood of receiving TC, contrary to the geopolitical logic
(Hypothesis 3 ). It is important to note that this result may also be affected by the tendency of some close US
allies not to apply for TC due to their advanced economic and nuclear status. Had those countries applied for
TC, perhaps the effect of US DISTANCE i,t−1 would have been different. However, some US allies are among
TC recipients, and these results suggest that their proximity to the US does not increase their likelihood of
receiving assistance compared to other similar IAEA members whose ideal point lies farther away from the
US.
Membership in the BOG has the opposite relationship from what is expected in Hypothesis 4 : BOG
members are less likely to request and receive TC assistance since the coefficient of this variable is negative
in all specifications, and statistically significant in model without controls, and in model with controls and
interaction between BOG and US DISTANCE. The negative relationship between BOG membership and
the likelihood of receiving TC could be due to the fact that countries that are very advanced in the nuclear
area tend to serve on the Board, and are also less likely to request assistance from the Agency. Thus, to see
if BOG membership affects the likelihood of TC through another variable, I examine the interaction between
BOGi,t−1 and US DISTANCE i,t−1.
The interaction results in three findings: 1) the coefficient of BOG is still negative and statistically
significant. This is because the US and countries perfectly aligned with it are less likely to receive TC; 2)
the coefficient of US DISTANCE i,t−1 is no longer statistically significant, suggesting that US friends are not
worse off than countries with opposing interests in terms of their likelihood to receive TC assistance; and
3) the interaction term is positive and significant. This implies that among BOG members with preferences
more distant from the US are more likely to receive TC assistance.
Figure 3 presents the average marginal effect of being a BOG member on the probability of receiving TC
22Examining the predicted probabilities of TC for various levels of GDP suggests that there is no statistically-significant
difference between the very poor and the middle-range countries, although the point estimates for the latter are higher than
the point estimates for the former.
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conditional on distance from the US ideal point. For countries that are aligned with the US (lower values on
the x-axis), the Figure shows that they are less likely to receive TC when they are members of the Board.
The Figure shows the opposite for countries whose preferences are far away from the US ideal point (higher
values on the x-axis): they are more likely to receive TC when they serve on the Board than when they do
not serve on the Board. In terms of the substantive effects, the Figure shows that for countries that are
very far from the US ideal point (0.75 or greater), serving on the Board increases their likelihood of TC by
about 10 percentage points. Conversely, being a BOG member results in a decrease of about 70 percentage
points in the likelihood of TC for countries that share many preferences with the US (0.05-0.1). This finding
strongly supports Hypothesis 5. To illustrate this finding, consider the case of Syria – a country that shares
very little interests with the US (distance of 0.95 on a scale between zero and one, where zero means perfect
alignment with the US preferences). Syria served on the BOG in 2005-2006. Prior and during its tenure,
the TC amounts Syria received ranged between $486,000 and $526,000 per year. Following its tenure, Syria
received $1,296,000 and $838,000 approved during its time on the Board.
Interestingly, the marginal effect of BOG membership on the likelihood of TC appears to be stronger
for countries that are close to the US ideal points (see the left hand side of Figure 3 compared to the right
hand side). One explanation could be that some US friends are less likely to apply for TC because they are
high-income countries that are also advanced in the nuclear area. As such, they are more likely to serve on
the Board (since Board membership is correlated to some extent with nuclear development). Thus, the left
hand side of Figure 3 may be affected by this selection effect whereby some countries that are very friendly
to the US, are more likely to be on the Board, and are also less likely to request TC. Indeed, non-recipients
of TC are closer to the US ideal point than recipients.23 The right hand side of Figure 3 is not driven by
this selection since it reflects a comparison between BOG and non-BOG members with preferences that lie
far from the US ideal point. Because selection effects (in this case, lack of interest in TC) are more likely to
apply to US friends24, the finding with respect to non-friends is not likely to be driven by these effects.
Moving on to examining the relationship between the likelihood of TC, distance to the US, and mem-
bership in AP, I interact AP i,t−1 with US DISTANCE i,t−1. Figure 4 shows the marginal effect of joining
the AP. Similarly to Figure 3, it appears that AP members that are far from the US ideal point are more
likely to receive TC compared to similar non-AP countries. The opposite is true with respect to countries
that share US policy preferences: they appear to be less likely to receive TC when they are AP member
compared to similar non-members. Furthermore, the effect of AP membership appears to be stronger for
23The mean distance is 0.44 and 0.67 for non-recipients and recipients, respectively.
24See Table A1 in supporting material
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Figure 3: Average marginal effect of being in BOG on the likelihood of receiving TC with 95% confidence
interval
countries that are close to the US ideal point (the drop on the left hand side is greater than the increase on
the right hand side). For example, AP members that are 0.05 points away from the US are associated with
a decrease of about 60 percentage points in their likelihood of receiving TC compared to non-AP members
with the same policy preferences. The likelihood of TC for AP members that are about 0.95 points away
from the US increases by about 10 percentage points when they compared to similar non-AP countries. The
United Arab Emirates (UAE) is a case in point. It signed the AP in 2009, and its membership came into
force in 2010). The UAE’s ideal point is far from the US preferences (about 0.85 on a scale between zero
and one). Prior to 2009, the UAE received on average less than $100,000 per year in TC assistance. In
2009 (the year it signed the AP), the TC increased to $455,700. In subsequent years, the UAE’s annual TC
has ranged between $397,137 - $706,727. Unlike the UAE, Qatar has not joined the AP. Although Qatar
has received considerable TC assistance (average of about $160,000 per year), it has not spiked as much as
UAE’s TC during these years.
Similarly to the finding on BOG membership, one explanation for this result may be that many of US
friends that are also AP members do not request TC (and thus do not receive assistance) since they are
advanced enough in the nuclear area. As before, this possible selection effect could shape the left hand
side of the Figure, but not the right hand side – the finding with respect to countries that do not share
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the US preferences. The results with respect to them are based on comparison between AP members and
non-members with policy preferences that lie far from the US ideal point. In robustness tests, I show that
the results with respect to these countries are not affected by data availability with respect to US friends.
Figure 4: Average marginal effect of joining the Additional Protocol on the likelihood of receiving TC with
95% confidence interval
Among the control variables, POPULATIONi,t−1 does not seem to be related to likelihood of TC. The
coefficient of DEMOCRACYi,t−1 is negative, but statistically not significant. Being a new member of the
IAEA is negatively associated with TC participation. Being NSG member (nuclear supplier) is negatively
related to TC assistance, though this relationship is not very robust. Having an active nuclear weapons
program has a positive relationship with TC. Finally, having a TC provision agreement with the Agency
(RSA) has a positive association with the likelihood of TC.
Amount of TC assistance
Table 4 focuses on country-years that receive TC, and examines the factors that are related to larger amounts
of TC. The number of observations is smaller than in Table 3 because country-years that do not participate
in TC are dropped. The dependent variable, TC AMOUNT i,t is continuous, and therefore I use a linear
regression, and control for the lagged dependent variable (LDV, or TC amounts in the previous year) to
account for path-dependence (Angrist and Pischke, 2008).
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Table 4: Amounts of TC
Coef./Std. err. Coef./Std. err. Coef./Std. err. Coef./Std. err. Coef./Std. err.
GDP (log) 0.01 -0.68 -0.14*** -0.14*** -0.15***
(0.04) (0.54) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
GDP (log) 0.01
square (0.01)
Conflicts 0.16** -0.04 -0.06 -0.05 -0.03
(0.07) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06)
US Distance 0.89*** 0.09 0.07 -0.26 -0.01
(0.27) (0.30) (0.29) (0.28) (0.29)
BOG member 0.17** 0.11 -0.20 0.09
(0.07) (0.08) (0.34) (0.08)
BOG member 0.46
×US Distance (0.45)
AP member -0.07 -0.07 -0.07 -0.91*** -0.08
(0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.33) (0.07)
AP member 1.28***
×US Distance (0.46)
Population (log) 0.26*** 0.27*** 0.26*** 0.26***
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
Democracy -0.02 -0.02 -0.04 -0.01
(0.13) (0.13) (0.13) (0.13)
New member 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.11
(0.27) (0.27) (0.27) (0.27)
NSG member -0.25 -0.22 -0.14 -0.23
(0.18) (0.17) (0.17) (0.19)
NW Program 0.06 0.14 0.10 0.12
(0.20) (0.18) (0.19) (0.14)
Rate of attainment 0.16** 0.15** 0.14** 0.15**
(0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06)
Elected BOG -0.08
(0.32)
Elected BOG 0.39
× US Distance (0.45)
Designated BOG -3.60**
(1.58)
Designated BOG 5.56**
×US Distance (2.17)
LDV 0.31*** 0.29*** 0.29*** 0.29*** 0.29***
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
Constant 7.97*** 15.72** 8.37*** 8.66*** 8.94***
(0.97) (7.47) (0.94) (0.90) (0.93)
R2 0.405 0.445 0.446 0.455 0.451
No. of obs 772 758 758 758 758
Note: OLS coefficients and robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses. The dependent
variable is TC AMOUNT i,t measured only for countries that receive TC. The first column presents re-
sults without controls, and without adjustment for time dependence. The second column adds controls
and adjustment for duration dependence. The third column adds the interaction between BOG i,t and US
DISTANCE i,t. The fourth column presents the interaction between AP i,t and US DISTANCE i,t
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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The results in Table ?? suggest that economic development is negatively related to the amount of TC
resources a country receives, though unlike the probability of TC, here there is no non-linear relationship
between GDP and the amount of assistance. The inclusion of the quadratic term renders both coefficients
statistically not significant, and I therefore drop the quadratic term from the remaining models. Based
on these results, I conclude that recipients with fewer resources receive more aid, and the amount of TC
assistance is decreasing in the recipient’s resources. This result is only partially supportive of Hypothesis 1a:
countries in the middle do not receive more TC aid.
Intrastate conflict is not consistently related to the amounts of aid countries receive from the IAEA.
The coefficient of CONFLICTSi,t is positive and statistically significant in the model without controls.
However, it becomes negative and statistically not significant in other models. This result does not support
the argument that more resources are given to countries that can put them to good use: having more violent
domestic conflicts does not seem to lead to a decrease in the amounts of TC, conditional on receiving aid.
Proximity to the US is also not a good predictor of the amount of TC assistance. The coefficient of US
DISTANCE i,t is positive in some models, suggesting the opposite from Hypothesis 3. It is significant only
in the model without control variables. Overall, this implies that among countries that receive TC, those
that share interests with the US are not more likely to receive larger amounts of TC assistance.25
Hypothesis 4, according to which members of the Board receive larger amounts of TC assistance, is also
only partially supported by these tests. The coefficient of BOGi,t is positive and significant in the model
without controls, but loses its significance and even changes sign when control variables and interaction
terms are included. The interaction term is also statistically not significant. A potential reason for these
results could be that Board members differ in terms of their ability to extract more resources for their TC
projects. Some BOG members serve on the Board only occasionally, whereas others are quasi-permanent
and have a lot of experience in the Agency. To examine this possibility, I distinguish between elected and
designated Board members.
A closer examination of Board members in the last column of Table ?? suggests that only the designated
BOG members differ in terms of the amount of aid that they receive: DESIGNATEDi,t is negative and
statistically significant, suggesting that designated BOG members with preferences identical to the US receive
lower amounts of aid when on the Board. The interaction term is positive and statistically significant,
suggesting that designated Board members receive more when their preferences lie far from those of the
25In this context, it is important to recall that some US allies – the high income countries – tend not to apply for TC, and
this result is based on those IAEA members that apply and receive assistance.
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US.26 This result partially supports the predictions of Hypothesis 5 that service on the Board benefits
countries that are not aligned with the US more than countries that share US interests.
In terms of the substantive effect, these results suggest that a country like South Africa that is relatively
distant from the US ideal point (about 0.75 on 0-1 scale) receives 77% more aid than a similar country that
is not a designated BOG member (95% confidence interval is 21%-159% increase in the amount of aid).27
TC to Argentina – a country slightly more friendly to the US (distance of about 0.6), is not significantly
affected by Argentina’s service on the Board. The results suggest that when a country like Argentina is
designated to the Board, it receives about 23% less aid than a similar country not on the Board, but this
result is not statistically-significant (the 95% confidence interval is -60%-46%).
The results further suggest that while being AP member does not affect the amounts of resources that
countries receive, AP members whose preferences lie farther away from the US receive larger disbursements
than AP members that share more interests with the US. This result supports Hypothesis 6. The substantive
effect also appears to be very significant. A case in point is Cuba that became AP member in 2004. Cuba’s
preferences are very far from the US ideal point (about 0.9 on 0-1 scale). Cuba also serves very often on
the Board, though as an elected and not as a designated member. When a country like Cuba becomes AP
member, its TC amounts increase by 27% (95% confidence interval is 1%-60%). Greece, who is a more
friendly country to the US (0.4 distance on 0-1 scale) joined the AP the same year as Cuba. A country
like Greece that is AP member receives 33% smaller amounts of TC (95% confidence interval is -9%–50%)
compared to a similar country that is not AP member.
Among the control variables, the coefficient of POPULATIONi,t−1 is positive and statistically signifi-
cant in all models, thus highlighting that more populous countries receive larger allocations. A good financial
record of supporting the TCF is also positive and significant for the amounts of aid, suggesting that the
Agency reciprocates by allocating larger amounts to those countries that contribute their share. The lagged
dependent variable is also positive and statistically significant, suggesting that there is continuity in the
amounts that countries receive from the IAEA. Political regime, tenure in the IAEA, level of nuclear devel-
opment, and the presence of an active nuclear weapons program appear to be unrelated to the amounts of
aid that TC participants receive.
26Examples of such countries include Cuba, South Africa, Argentina, and Brazil that often serve as designated members of
the Board.
27Using the margins command in Stata, I calculate the predicted effect of BOG membership on the amounts of TC for
countries with 0.75 distance from the US ideal point. The result is 0.57 (95% CI is 0.20-0.95). Since the dependent variable is
in log form, I use the following formula to calculate the percent change in aid allocation: %∆y = 100× (eβ1 − 1). In this case,
β=0.57.
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Areas of Assistance
Table 5 examines TC assistance in two areas – nuclear fuel-cycle and the application of nuclear technologies in
agriculture and health. In particular, these tests analyze whether country’s level of resources and intrastate
conflict affect aid in these two areas. In these regressions, I use all IAEA members (not only TC recipients).
The results in Table 5 suggest that recipient’s resources are not associated with TC assistance in fuel-
cycle, contrary to Hypothesis 1b. Initially, the coefficient of GDPi,t−1 is positive and statistically significant,
but it loses its significance when control variables and the quadratic term are added.
The finding with respect to agriculture and health assistance is more supportive of Hypothesis 1b: the
coefficient of GDPi,t is negative and statistically significant except when the quadratic term is introduced.
This suggests that recipients with fewer resources are more likely to receive assistance in areas related to
agriculture and health.
There is no indication that intrastate conflicts are related to nuclear fuel-cycle assistance, in contradiction
to Hypothesis 2b. There is also no relationship between conflict and assistance in agriculture and health,
though this finding is consistent with Hypothesis 2b.
Relationship with the US is not a good predictor of TC assistance in neither of these areas, and neither
is membership in the Board. With respect to the AP, it is interesting to note that AP members are less
likely to receive assistance related to fuel cycle, though this result is significant only in a model with no
controls. Population size exhibits a positive and statistically significant relationship with assistance in both
areas, though it is more statistically significant with respect to agriculture and health. The coefficient of
NSG i,t−1 is positive and statistically significant at 10% with respect to fuel-cycle assistance, and negative
and not statistically significant with respect to assistance in agriculture and health. This suggests that, just
like with the GDP, countries that are more developed in the nuclear area are more likely to receive fuel-cycle
assistance. Having an active nuclear weapons program is not associated with assistance neither in nuclear
fuel-cycle nor in health and agriculture. New members are not less likely than other to receive aid in these
two areas. Finally, having a TC provision agreement (RSA) is a good predictor of assistance.
Robustness checks
Figures 3 and 4 demonstrate that BOG and AP membership have a bigger absolute effect on countries that
share the US preferences than on countries that are far away from the US ideal point. This is puzzling
because it implies that being a BOG member and joining the AP punishes the US friends more than it
rewards its enemies. One reason for this finding could be that US friends are developed countries that do
27
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not participate in TC, and thus it appears that BOG and AP membership have a negative effect on them.
To explore whether this negative effect drives the apparent positive effect of BOG membership and joining
the AP on countries that do not share the US interests, in Table 6, I exclude countries that are close to
the US ideal point (US DISTANCE<0.67, the median distance). This reduces the sample size from 1066
country-years to 530.28 Results in Table 6 are similar to results in Table 3 . Thus, I conclude that the
results in Table 3 (especially the results with respect to countries that are far from the US ideal point) are
not driven by the negative association between BOG membership and joining the AP on US friends.
Summary and Implications
This paper explains what affects the allocation of the IAEA TC resources – the main vehicle through which
the IAEA provides assistance to its member states in the application of nuclear technologies to peaceful
uses. I focus on four theoretical explanations for TC allocation: need- and capacity-driven aid, proximity to
the US interests, membership in key decision-making bodies, and concessions-for-aid. I examine how these
explanations affect the likelihood of requesting and receiving TC, the amounts of TC, and the substantive
field of TC. I find that countries with moderate levels of resources are more likely to receive TC assistance
than very high- and very low-income countries. However, conditional on receiving TC, countries with lower
GDP receive higher amounts of assistance – a finding that is consistent with the need-based allocation
argument. Similarly, I find that they are also more likely to receive aid in health and agriculture areas.
Together these results imply that need-based explanations matter, especially when it comes to areas closely
related to development (health and agriculture).
The findings also suggest that political factors matter. Although shared policy preferences with the US,
BOG membership, and concessions in most cases are not directly related to TC allocation, their effects are
conditional on each other. In particular, countries that do not share many preferences with the US are more
likely to receive TC when they become BOG members, or when they join the AP – a concession valued by the
IAEA and the powerful players. Additionally, the amount of assistance is related to some political factors.
Countries that do not share the US policy preferences receive more assistance when they join AP than similar
countries that are not AP members. These findings support studies that highlight the role of foreign aid in
extracting policy concessions that recipient countries would not have made otherwise (Bueno de Mesquita
and Smith, 2007). Likewise, these countries receive larger amounts of TC when they serve as designated
28I can no longer estimate the coefficient of NSGi,t−1 because most of the country-years left are not members in the NSG.
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Table 6: Participation in TC excluding countries that are close to the US ideal point
Coef./Std. err. Coef./Std. err.
GDP (log) 15.26*** 18.31*
(5.80) (9.56)
GDP (log) square -0.27** -0.33*
(0.11) (0.18)
Conflicts -0.48 -0.37
(0.70) (0.96)
US Distance -3.13 -0.42
(6.21) (7.45)
BOG member -23.64*** -1.42
(8.05) (1.76)
BOG member × US Distance 29.58**
(11.99)
AP member 2.28** -705.34***
(1.12) (211.09)
AP member × US Distance 1046.75***
(312.84)
Population (log) -0.66 -0.60
(0.62) (0.63)
Democracy 0.99 1.06
(1.20) (1.23)
New member -5.08*** -5.26***
(1.44) (1.69)
NSG member 0.00 0.00
(.) (.)
NW Program 1.48 1.52
(1.61) (1.45)
RSA agreement in force 0.51 0.29
(1.03) (1.18)
Constant -195.34** -236.56*
(76.27) (125.31)
R2
No. of obs 530 530
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. These results are comparable to Table 3, two rightmost columns.
Here I exclude countries with ideal point <0.67 (the median distance from the US).
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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members of the Board than similar countries that are not on the Board.
Similarly to other studies that explore the determinants of aid allocation using data on aid flows (for
example, Alesina and Dollar (2000) and Neumayer (2003)), this paper has no access to information on
requests for TC since these data are not publicly-available. This data restriction could potentially affect the
interpretation of some of the results. In particular, the effect of Board / AP membership may appear to
be positive only for countries that are far from the US ideal point because those countries that share policy
preferences with the US are less likely to apply for TC in the first place because they are relatively more
advanced in the nuclear area, and are less likely to require the IAEA assistance. despite this restriction, it is
important to note that some countries that are close to the US apply for TC and receive the IAEA assistance,
and that TC is not limited only to those countries that are far from the US ideal point. The robustness
checks presented here suggest that this finding holds even if we drop close US allies from the estimation.
More importantly, the unavailability of data on TC requests does not affect the finding that countries whose
preferences diverge from the US ideal point are more likely to receive TC when they serve on the Board
or join AP. These results are based on comparison between BOG and AP members and non-members with
the same policy preferences (i.e. far from the US ideal point). Unlike the US-friendly countries, there is no
indication that countries with ideal points that lie far from the US preferences refrain from requesting TC.
Furthermore, this data availability does not affect the results on the amounts of TC, since these tests focus
only on countries that receive assistance.
Another potential caveat is the possibility that these findings are affected by the IAEA’s particular
circumstances. This raises the question of whether patterns from one organization are relevant for other
IOs. It is impossible to answer this question using data from one organization. However, the dual role of
the IAEA – its monitoring and developmental missions – suggest that the Agency may reflect dynamics of
different types of organizations. The pattern with respect to assistance in health and agriculture may be
similar to assistance allocation by such IOs as the World Health Organization or the Food and Agriculture
Organization, whereas the distribution of sensitive aid may be more unique to the IAEA, or perhaps similar
to such organizations as the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons or the Comprehensive
Nuclear Test Ban Treaty Organization. Moreover, the fact that the financial value of TC is smaller compared
to the benefits allocated by the IMF can account for why proximity to the US plays a different role than
it does in other IOs where it was found to be positively related to aid: countries that are not aligned with
the US benefit from IAEA TC assistance because the economic stakes are lower, and the concessions that
they provide are not as costly domestically as the concessions they make in the IMF or the WTO contexts.
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Finally, the IAEA’s key role in verifying compliance with nonproliferation commitments, and the Board’s
central position in deciding whether countries comply with these obligations make the IAEA BOG similar
to the UNSC. Thus, similarly to the Security Council (Bueno de Mesquita and Smith, 2010), also here BOG
members receive benefits when they serve in a position of power. All in all, comparison of these results to
studies of other IOs suggests that economic and political factors can play a role, and that their precise role is
also affected by the context and the type of IO, and that there is no single pattern that fits all organizations.
This paper also has implications for understanding the connection between TC and nuclear prolifera-
tion. Recent studies highlight the concerning link between civilian nuclear cooperation and proliferation
(Fuhrmann, 2009a), and specifically the connection between receiving TC and developing a nuclear weapons
program (Brown and Kaplow, 2014). In this context, the finding that some countries that do not have many
common preferences with the US receive more TC may be worrying in light of the possible contribution of
this assistance to their non-peaceful nuclear activities. However, my findings also show that these countries
are more likely to receive TC and receive larger amounts of TC when they join AP, and this provides reas-
surance that TC recipients are likely to be subject to stringent nonproliferation safeguards. These findings
also have a potential policy implication, in that TC assistance can be used to incentivize countries to accept
additional nonproliferation commitments. That being said, it is important to keep in mind that many IAEA
members, especially the developing countries, strongly oppose any explicit linkage between TC and nonpro-
liferation. Finally, the findings here suggest that having a nuclear weapons program is positively associated
with the likelihood of receiving TC. This result complements the finding in Kroenig (2009b) who reports a
positive correlation between sensitive transfers and nuclear proliferation. Notwithstanding this correlation,
it is important to note that there is some evidence that membership in NSG (an export control group) is
positively associated with nuclear fuel cycle-related assistance29, thereby suggesting that these countries are
less likely to further spread their knowledge and capabilities without proper regulations.
Finally, this paper focuses on shared preferences between recipients and the US. The US is indeed a very
influential player and the biggest donor to the TC program. However, it is worth noting that several other
IAEA members share the US interest in nonproliferation, and that their position, as well as the IAEA’s
own standing and reputation on these issues support the US efforts to promote its nonproliferation priorities
through the organization.
29The relationship between nuclear weapons program, NSG, and sensitive TC is significant at 10%,
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